1798

A REPLY TO A PAMPHLET, ENTITLED, ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST AN UNION.

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THE author of the following pages has, perhaps, an apology to make to the public for obtruding upon them obſervations on ſome ſubjects, which lie ſo much without the ſphere of his purſuits and ſtudies.—But the avidity with which every publication on the ſubject is received, and the ſilence of gentlemen beſt qualified to inform us on ſome of the moſt important topics, will excuſe him for offering thoſe remarks on commercial matters, which he is ſufficiently convinced muſt be extremely imperfect. However, the ſources of his information are well known—his facts he truſts will be found to be correctly ſtated—and his concluſions appear to himſelf fair and natural.

He has introduced, perhaps unadviſedly, one or two collateral opinions, of the propriety of which indeed doubts may be juſtly

juſtly entertained—particularly reſpecting the policy of our being *bound* to follow England in her ſupport of a war, and of our contributing hereafter to the reduction of the debt of England.—But they ſo far conduce to the main arguments, by ſhewing, that, *if expedient*, the meaſures could be adapted with equal or greater convenience by our own Parliament.

In his obſervations on the Regency, it is unneceſſary for him to ſay he means no alluſion to certain venerated characters, who took that part on the queſtion of Regency which the author cenſures.—Their views and motives have never been queſtioned—it is equally unneceſſary for him to ſay, who they are, that he would thus diſtinguiſh from their corrupt aſſociates.

A

REPLY, &c.

THE great queſtion of an Union is at length formally announced; at leaſt it has been declared by high authority that it is to be ſubmitted to Parliament, and a publication has appeared upon the ſubject, generally underſtood to proceed from the pen of a perſon much in confidence.

That the feelings of the Country would be affected, that its pride, and perhaps its vengeance would be rouſed by the bare mention of the ſurrender of its legiſlature, the author of that publication ſeems to be apprized, and therefore wiſely enough beſpeaks a cool and calm diſcuſſion, to which he well knew the na-

ture of his ſubject little entitled him. The author of the following pages heartily concurs in deprecating both *paſſion* and *force*. It is with calm and dignified reſolution that he truſts the nation will meet this injurious inſult, and he hopes that it is not by *force* the miniſter will attempt to accompliſh his project. But that ſome ſuſpicion ſhould be entertained on the latter ground, is no way ſurpriſing, from the extraordinary circumſtances, under which the propoſition is made—The nation panting and breathleſs after the horrors and agonies of a bloody rebellion, animoſities, religious and civil, ſtill diſtracting us—a moſt formidable army ſtill and neceſſarily kept up—great diſcretionary powers as neceſſarily ſtill exerciſed by the executive magiſtrate—under circumſtances ſuch as theſe, who will venture to expreſs in the honeſt terms of virtuous indignation his opinion on the annihilation of our Parliament? Who will venture to ſpeak the language with which a few years back the degrading project would have been received? The terror of the triangles and the gallows may perhaps operate as forcibly as the arguments of the Secretary.

The author of the publication alluded to, affects to conſider *chiefly* the advantages to reſult to *Ireland* from the Union, and as the friend of *Ireland*, he uſes his beſt arguments, ſuch,

ſuch as they are, in its favour. It would not be polite to queſtion the veracity of a gentleman aſſerting his motives and objects, and therefore, without inſinuating what might be the views of the *Engliſh* ſervant of an *Engliſh* cabinet, his work ſhall be treated as the *pure* and *diſintereſted* production of a true born Iriſhman, expreſſing the convictions of an unbiaſſed underſtanding.

The great and happy conſequences of an Union, he expects, will be the calming and ſoothing the public mind—the removal of all religious and political animoſities—the civilization of a barbarous and turbulent people—the introduction of induſtry and the arts, of a reſpect for the laws, of manufactures, commerce and wealth, and the conſequent aggrandiſement of the Empire in ſtrength, power, and importance. If ſuch indeed were to be the mighty conſequences, if the magic of the Secretary's pen could extend the omnipotence of Parliament to the works of Nature, and annihilate the ſea which ſeparates the kingdoms, if Engliſh manners, Engliſh morals, Engliſh arts, and above all, *Engliſh Liberty*, the parent of whatever adorns and exalts England above the reſt of the world, were to follow, who would not laugh at the ſilly declaimer that would talk of national pride and national independence? Nay, if theſe con-

conſequences were problematical, but the exiſtence or ſafety of the *Britiſh Empire*, on whoſe ſafety and exiſtence the happineſs of *Ireland* unqueſtionably reſts, were dependant on the adoption of this meaſure, on that ground alone the ſacrifice ſhould be made of national pride; and every good man ſhould endeavour to ſoften down the warm feelings which characteriſe, and I think do not diſgrace our country. But it is from a thorough conviction that none of thoſe happy conſequences are to be expected, on the contrary that the greateſt dangers are to be dreaded, extending perhaps to the connection itſelf, that in my opinion this meaſure ſhould be reſiſted.

The grand and primary conſideration, paramount to every other, however important in itſelf, to trade, manufactures and civilization, is the effect on the Empire; on the ſafety and power of the Empire depend the ſafety and power of its members, of mighty Britain, as well as inferior Ireland, and if, as the Secretary ſeems to dread, any colliſion between the countries is to be apprehended from the preſent ſtate of their connection, ſome argument would certainly ariſe for an alteration.

But let us ſee how the queſtion ſtands—no circumſtance that has hitherto cauſed any (I will not

not ſay diſagreement) but any diſcuſſion, now exiſts between the two kingdoms—our conſtitution has been long ſince finally ſatisfactorily and it is hoped *irrevocably* ſettled. The King of England is ipſo facto King of Ireland: the whole of the prerogative which he poſſeſſes in the former kingdom, and which is found ſo ſufficient for its happy adminiſtration—the whole of the patronage which ſupplies the place of obſolete prerogative, he poſſeſſes as amply here, as in England—here, in a comparatively poor country, as in England rich proud and independent. From what ſtubborn ſymptoms then the well informed author has deduced his fears of differences between the Iriſh Parliament and the executive power, I am at a loſs to conjecture; but I believe he himſelf could give the moſt ſatisfactory anſwer to the apprehenſions he raiſes.

In one, and one only inſtance is he juſtified by experience—the memorable inſtance of the *regency*; but what does this ſolitary inſtance prove? A difference from the *exiſting* cabinet of England in compliance with the wiſhes of, what was ſuppoſed to be, the *ſucceeding one*—and whatever reſpect may be due to the names and, characters of the leaders of the prevailing party on that memorable occaſion, it muſt be admitted, that their conduct was a ſacrifice of principle, and of the ſpirit of our connection with Great Britain, to perſonal ambition and party intereſts,

intereſts, but the very circumſtances of the tranſaction ſhow how improbable it is, that patronage in an Iriſh Parliament will ever operate againſt prerogative. The meaſure was carried, not by a regard to the intereſts or the dignity of Ireland, but by a belief that the party gratified would have the diſpoſal of the patronage, and the exerciſe of the prerogative of the crown. When the queſtion was fortunately ſet to reſt by the happy recovery of our Sovereign, the excuſe of thoſe who had turned their backs on the adminiſtration that foſtered them, their ſhameleſs and profligate excuſe was, that they had made a *bad gueſs*.

This certainly is an inſtance, but it is the only one, wherein the Iriſh Parliament ever differed from that of Great Britain on an imperial queſtion, and it would perhaps ſet at defiance the ingenuity of the ſagacious author of the "Arguments," to ſuggeſt another inſtance, wherein we ſhould expect a ſimilar colliſion. This however was a *caſus omiſſus* in our conſtitution; upon every principle there is as much neceſſity that the regent of Britain ſhould be regent of Ireland, with the ſame powers and under the ſame reſtrictions, as there ſhould be one king, with the ſame prerogatives. Why the poſſibility of the recurrence of the evil has been permitted to continue for ſo many years, it is not for the author to explain. But certainly the miniſter, with great facility in Parliament, and to the entire

tire approbation of the country, might have ſet the queſtion at reſt for ever. The plauſible argument however for the poſſible differences of opinion on *imperial queſtions*, might have been weakened: and this evil, ſo eaſily and ſo ſatisfactorily remediable, has been ſuffered to continue. One inſtance then and one only, an inſtance never likely to occur again, and whoſe recurrence might be prevented, it may be aſſerted, with the unanimous aſſent of Parliament and of the nation, has been given, of any danger to the empire, by the exiſtence of ſeparate Parliaments. The *official author* is a ſenſible and *experienced* man, he cannot be ſerious when he talks of the Parliament of Ireland, "pleaſing to act contrary to the policy of the Empire; exhorting the King to make war, when the views of England are pacific; or declaring againſt a war, when England is driven into one by neceſſity." The caſe is without example, and the ſtrongeſt ties of intereſt, public and *private*, national and *individual*, muſt forbid us to ſuppoſe there would be ſuch a reſiſtance of the *patronage* of the crown, in order to oppoſe its *prerogative*.

Far different from this conſideration are other queſtions alluded to—the Catholic queſtion particularly, and the commercial propoſitions ſo far as they came under Parliamentary diſcuſſion here, they were national and not imperial concerns; and they afford the ſtrongeſt proof

proof of the neceſſity of a national and particular Parliament, to regulate the domeſtic relations and economy of the kingdom. Whether the Parliament were right or wrong in firſt reſiſting, and afterwards conceding the Catholic claims, whether they ſhould ever have granted any thing, or whether they ſhould have granted all. Whether they were actuated by misjudging pride and radical ignorance of the ſubject in rejecting the commercial regulations, is not now to be conſidered. But, ſo far as thoſe circumſtances came before them, ſo far as they were preſented to Parliament, and debated upon, on all ſides, both by miniſters, and oppoſition, they were treated merely as *Iriſh* queſtions; no doubt was raiſed upon them as endangering, affecting, injuring or ſecuring the imperial connection; ſo that before any uſe can be made of the conduct of Ireland with reſpect to theſe, it muſt be maintained, that Ireland is unfit to diſcuſs or determine a queſtion, relating merely to her own immediate concerns; and the ſame argument would apply to Britain, or any other country, diſcuſſing, and excluſively deciding a queſtion, in which itſelf was *excluſively intereſted* —the more particularly, that queſtion relates to the individual country, on the contrary, the better fitted muſt it be, to form a ſound and rational queſtion upon it, on its various and minute relations and conſequences; and the more unfit muſt another country be, ſituated

ted differently, to interfere or to legiſlate for it. The Catholic queſtion therefore was unfortunately choſen as an inſtance: had this been left to the good ſenſe of the nation, operating gradually and naturally, neither prematurely forced, nor raſhly checked, we ſhould not have witneſſed the groſs and unfortunate inconſiſtencies, which diſgraced our Parliament and our country. Violent grand jury reſolutions, ſuppoſed to be countenanced by government; Catholic petitions, ignominiouſly kicked out of the Houſe of Commons, next ſeſſion paſſed. Full participation of rights promiſed, from the higheſt authority—and, in the ſame ſeſſion, the ſtipulated meaſures refuſed; all theſe inconſiſtencies flowed from *Britiſh* interference, in what was not *imperial* but *national* concern, and therefore all tend moſt ſtrongly to ſhew the ſuperior advantage of a domeſtic Parliament for the regulation of domeſtic concerns. But it may be ſaid, this is an imperial matter, it concerns the religion of the ſtate, which ſhould be the ſame in both kingdoms—grant that it is, it only follows that it ſhould be finally adjuſted, and that, as in the caſe of the King, it ſhould be enacted by both legiſlatures, that the religion of the Parliaments ſhould be the ſame, and that neither ſhould alter it without the aſſent of the other, but till this be done, it remains an individual concern of each kingdom, of which each, according to its local circumſtances, is the beſt judge.

But it is ſaid, the Iriſh Parliament is a theatre for Britiſh faction; from the application the miniſterial author makes, I ſuſpect he means Britiſh *oppoſition*, and that his object is, to diminiſh, circumſcribe, or ſmother oppoſition to the exiſting cabinet, of which he is ſo faithful a ſervant. That much advantage would redound to his employers, in this reſpect, the example of Scotland leaves little room to doubt. The Scots Lords and Commoners give very little trouble on the ſcore of oppoſition to the miniſter; but, whether the addition of 100 members, lords or gentlemen, to the miniſterial phalanx, would be an imperial advantage, is a point, the moſt conſtitutional and loyal Engliſhman will perhaps be inclined to doubt, as much as the moſt factious Iriſhman.

To brand with the name of factious the minority in Parliament, has ever been the trick of the majority, and epithets have varied with the circumſtances of the times. In the reigns of William and Anne—*Jacobite* and Pretender were bandied about by both Whig and Tory, according as they were in power, and perhaps with equal juſtice. For the ſcandalous anecdotes of thoſe reigns ſhew, that miniſters, no more than oppoſition, were exempt from the contagion of foreign influence, and foreign bribes.* Whether, when

* Vide Dalrymple's Memoirs, and Macpherſon's Hiſtory and State Papers.

when the lapſe of time ſhall have made it ſafe to unfold to mankind the ſecrets of the preſent day, ſimilar motives ſhall be found to have operated, it may not be prudent or delicate to conjecture, but as to the branding with the epithets of Jacobine and Republican every man who differs from the miniſter, the trick is ſtale, and has nearly loſt its effect. Suppoſing, however, for a moment the fact to be, that the Engliſh oppoſition are a deſperate republican faction, bribed by French gold, or, what would be equally criminal, bent on the accompliſhment of their ambitious views, at the hazard of ſeparating the two kingdoms, how are we to conclude from experience, the only ſafe guide in matter of ſuch import, that our ſeparate exiſtence would facilitate their machinations? Not ſurely from the experience of the preſent day; never was any Parliament ſo zealous, ſo vigilant, ſo anxious, ſo ſcrutinizing as the Iriſh Parliament, on the occaſion of the late rebellion: not a breath of murmur or oppoſition was uttered againſt the ſtrongeſt meaſures, that adminiſtration wiſhed to adopt; every additional weapon that the executive magiſtrate demanded, every guinea that he could require, voted, not merely with chearfulneſs, but with anticipating alacrity, and without a ſingle diſſenting voice. Here was the pre-eminent advantage of a ſeparate Parliament; had ſuch been the conduct of a Britiſh Parliament, though with the concurrence of

every Iriſh member in it; faction on this ſide of the water might ſtill have ſaid—you are miſinformed, you are miſguided, the Iriſh members are the creatures of a miniſter, they abuſe your credulity, it is not a rebellion, it is only the ebullition of the wretched ignorant peaſantry, goaded on to acts of violence by military tyranny. Such *was* the language of perſons, even of the beſt intentions, (for ſuch in ſpite of faction, are the Duke of Devonſhire, Lord Fitzwilliam, &c.) of perſons, whoſe connections here procured them as good information, as any men can have in *another kingdom*, and therefore as good as our members could have ſitting in the Britiſh Parliament. It was only a Parliament ſitting upon the ſpot, ſeeing with its own eyes, and hearing with its own ears, that was adequate to ſtop the utterance of ſuch dangerous and unfounded ſentiments: no man could be hardy enough, when rebellion ſurrounded the very walls of our city, lurked in our dwellings, and met us in the face of our moſt truſted ſervants, no man could be found hardy enough to deny the real fact, to palliate the crimes, or to refuſe the neceſſary aid to the executive power.

But at the very ſame moment, when the *facts* had reached the ears of the Parliament of England, was there a great body of the

prime

prime Nobility of England, as deeply intereſted in the integrity of the Empire, and in the individual ſafety of Ireland, as any Iriſh Members could be, ſo ignorant of circumſtances, notwithſtanding all their means of information, as to divide a conſiderable number in favour of a moſt unwiſe and dangerous interference. Suppoſe then, that at that awful moment, an imperial Parliament had been ſitting upon our concerns, the ſame miſrepreſentations and miſconceptions, which led aſtray ſo many perſons deeply concerned in the welfare of Ireland, might have alſo miſled the majority of the Iriſh Members. Facts, imperfectly known, without any of their minute and nice circumſtances, and ſtated by apparently the beſt authorities, might have a powerful effect on the Parliament. The executive magiſtrate, whether military or civil, acting here according to the beſt of his judgment, would be thwarted or intimidated by the dread of cenſure or puniſhment, from a power inadequate to judge ſoundly of the merits of his conduct; and thus he would be paralyſed inſtead of encouraged in thoſe bold and decided meaſures, which on the late occaſion could alone have ſaved us. To the inveſtigation of an Iriſh Parliament are we indebted for the developement of the deep laid conſpiracy, in vain could we have expected, in another kingdom,

ſuch

ſuch compleat and undeniable proofs of the whole origin, progreſs and circumſtances of the rebellion; and therefore there was as much ſound wiſdom as true patriotiſm in the expreſſions of a great judicial character, when he hoped, "*that the oppoſition of England would be now convinced, that the Parliament of Ireland were alone competent to the affairs of Ireland.*"*

When the mutiny of the ſeamen menaced the exiſtence of the Empire, Mr. Sheridan ſtepped forward, with his advice, and received the applauſe of the miniſtry themſelves, for his able and patriotic aſſiſtance. What was his remedy? That if the mutiny continued, *the Parliament of Great Britain* ſhould travel from *Weſtminſter to Portſmouth*, and never ceaſe its deliberations even in the very face of the mutineers and expoſed to their fury, till it had quelled the rebellion, or periſhed in the attempt. The ſubſiding of the ſtorm happily made it unneceſſary to reſort to this laſt extremity. May no ſimilar emergency ever ariſe again! may the raſh project of miniſtry, if it ſhall be obſtinately perſevered in, raiſe no flames of diſcord in this kingdom! but ſhould, unhappily, the diſguſts and diſſentions of an angry people invite the enemy to our ſhores—ſhould the ardour and enthuſiaſm of our gentry feel any abatement from the ſenſe of national degradation—the miniſter, as well as Ireland

* The Chancellor.

Ireland, may lament, when it is too late, the deſtruction of our native Parliament.

The miniſterial Author ſtates the circumſtances of our preſent connection—the inconveniencies ariſing from the jealouſies and bickerings it occaſions—and their probable removal by an Union:—But indeed to a ſuperficial reader, every argument that he employs on this head ſeems to apply moſt ſtrongly againſt himſelf. The reſidence of the Sovereign in England—the predominating weight of the Britiſh Cabinet—the number of abſentees. No Iriſhman was ever yet ſo abſurd as to complain of the King's reſidence in London, or ſo weak as to expect that any circumſtance could ever produce any alteration in this reſpect—but whatever viſionaries might dream, under the preſent ſtate of things, of the King coming to Ireland, is it poſſible that a Union could realize his fancies? As little does any reaſonable man complain of the ſuperintending and directing powers of a Britiſh Cabinet. The neceſſity of this has never been combated, but by thoſe, who would wiſh to diſſolve the connection, and who would, in caſe of a Union, argue more forcibly, and it is feared more effectually. It is the *degree* of the interference, it is the quantum of weight, that ſhould be given to powerful leaders at home, which has ever been the ſubject of diſpute. Not whether my

Lord

—Lord Lieutenant ſhould take the grand outline of his meaſures from the Britiſh miniſter, or an Iriſh junto, but whether, in the detail of meaſures, in thoſe matters, which muſt neceſſarily be devolved upon the diſcretion of the Viceroy, Lord A. or Lord B. or Mr. C. ſhould be conſulted and followed. Such are the jealouſies, ſuch are the petty conteſts for *confidence*, for diſtinction, for emolument, which produce the jealouſies, the ſquabbles, that no doubt teize and perplex a Lord Lieutenant, but with which the nation has nothing to do, and in which it takes no part. Sometimes indeed theſe diſputes are carried acroſs the water, and break in upon the more important labours of the miniſter—they removed one Lord Lieutenant, and perhaps, they endeavoured to remove a ſecond. But the exiſting circumſtances ſhew how little trouble they will give, by a moderate firmneſs in an honourable and virtuous courſe. Let a Lord Lieutenant of *good ſenſe*, and, what is better, of *good intentions*, previouſly apprized of the cauſe of public diſcontents, uſe *his own eyes* and *his own ears*—let him ſteadily purſue his courſe, unaffected by the turbulent clamours, or the undermining calumny, of diſappointed factions; let him find a determined ſupport in the Cabinet of England; let him beſtow preferment on the pious, the learned, and the induſtrious—regardleſs of the jobbing and the venal, and he will find his labours ſoon become eaſy, and the gratitude and bleſſings of a tranquilized

quilized and ſatisfied country follow his name and the Cabinet under which he acts. *Such is the ſituation of Ireland.* But ſuppoſe the ſituation changed—Iriſhmen placed in the Engliſh Cabinet, and no impartial and diſintereſted medium between that Cabinet and the Iriſh Nation; all meaſures muſt then be tranſacted by a *Great Contractor*; that is all meaſures that would be entruſted to Iriſhmen, the filling up of biſhoprieks, of judges places, of ſeats at the revenue board.

But "*the Britiſh Cabinet would receive a mixture of Iriſhmen!*" "*The counſels of the Britiſh Parliament would be much influenced by the* WEIGHT AND ABILITY *of the* IRISH MEMBERS."!

Is the under Secretary, an *Engliſhman*, is he ſerious, when he ſpeaks of the Britiſh Parliament being *much influenced* by the *weight and ability* of the *Iriſh* members? or does he fondly ſuppoſe, that we have never heard of the *irreſiſtible weight and influence* of the Britiſh miniſter in the Britiſh Parliament, or that we are ſtrangers to the name and the character of Mr. Pitt. Mr. Pitt ſuffer the Britiſh Parliament to be much influenced by the weight and ability of the Iriſh members! Mr. Pitt, who could whirl out of the cabinet the gigantic Thurlow,—Mr. Pitt, who, at

the very outſet of his adminiſtration, could brave and conquer the Houſe of Commons of *Britain!* Mr. Pitt, *who carried* A UNION! Mr. Pitt, in the plenitude of his power and his glory, much influence by the weight and ability of the Iriſh Members! No my worthy credulous countrymen, future Lords and Commoners of the Union Parliament, however you may eſtimate your conſequence and your talents, it is impoſſible your ſelf-love, exorbitant as it may be, can ſo groſly deceive you. Your vanity or your avarice may indeed be gratified, ſome one of you may obtain the patronage of Ireland, or diſtinct boards may be erected, at which Iriſhmen ſhall preſide for the Church, the Law, and the Revenue. But influence the counſels of the Britiſh Parliament! you cannot be ſo ignorant or ſo vain as to expect it. Let the Button-Makers of Birmingham, or the Fuſtian-Weavers of Mancheſter raiſe an outcry of Iriſh rivalry, and let our Mr. Foſter, with all his weight and all his ability, demonſtrate the ruin of our manufacture from a compliance with their demands, and, I believe the *influence of all the Iriſh Members* muſt yield to the *mechanics* of a ſingle town.

But "there would be no claſhing of diſtinct in-
"tereſts, the cultivation, the improvement of
"Ireland, like that of Scotland, would be pecu-
"liarly

" liarly attended to, as the increaſe of our " wealth, conſequence, ability, and power muſt " tend to increaſe the ſecurity of the Empire, " not to endanger it; *and in proportion that* " *as we felt the benefit of the Union, our at-* " *tachment to it would be ſtrengthened.*" This may be in ſome meaſure true, as ſoon as there was " *no fear of Ireland being too pow-* *erful to govern.*" But ſo long as this fear operates, ſo long as " *it is manifeſt that a connection with France has been renewed,*" ſo long " *as it is obvious the French will* " *not ceaſe to intrigue in this kingdom:*" ſo long it muſt be the plaineſt policy of England, *to keep down Ireland,* " *leſt ſhe ſhould* " *be* TOO POWERFUL TO GOVERN."

For myſelf I aver, that however warm my feelings of national pride, feelings which in *me* are as much *Engliſh* as *Iriſh*, I ſhould rather ſubmit to the uncontrouled dominion of England, and to the deſtruction of our Parliament, without any equivalent real or pretended, than accept aid of France; ſo rooted is my deteſtation of her horrid principles, and ſo firm is my conviction, that the day which ſhould make us her ally, would confirm us her ſlave:; and that I would myſelf co-operate in keeping down the proſperity of my Country, if her becoming " *too powerful,*" were to end in ſuch a cataſtrophe.

But it is the ſincere conviction of my mind, that the propoſed Union, the inflicting ſo deep a wound in our national pride, the death of our parliament, the reducing a powerful, growing kingdom, to a ſmall and petty member of the Empire, will multiply and invigorate the friends of the French connection, and diſhearten, diſguſt, alienate, and diminiſh the friends to the Britiſh intereſt. Who are they whoſe pride and conſequence will be moſt humbled? the loyal and ſpririted yeomen and gentry, who have fought and bled in ſupport of our conſtitution as it now ſtands. Who will leave the country, or ſwell the liſt of abſentees? (a conſequence which the advocate for Union admits,) the wretched, corrupted rabble, with the profligate conſpirators? or the loyal and powerful nobility and gentry? Five and twenty of the principal nobility, eighty or ninety of the firſt gentlemen, neceſſarily withdrawn to attend Parliament; add to theſe, all who will be attracted by intereſt, or ſeduced by pleaſure, or ſickened at the deſerted ſtreets of Dublin; every one, in ſhort, who could command, reclaim, or ſoothe a wretched peaſantry, will be loſt to Ireland, and the kingdom muſt become one vaſt barrack, for military force will be the only one left to keep down our currupted and licentious people. In this ſituation, will Britiſh Capital, Britiſh merchants, Britiſh manufactures deſert, their ſecure, warm, comfortable, eſtabliſh-

eſtabliſhments, to ſettle among a humiliated, degraded and diſcontented people?

But the Catholics will be gratified, and their ſatisfaction will reſtore peace and order! Perhaps the Secretary may have ſome ſecret "opening," —but it was certainly prudent not to give a more open hint, leſt he ſhould alarm the zealous Proteſtants, who have at preſent ſo much of the power in their hands. It is indeed unfortunate for him, that he could not have addreſſed a ſeparate Pamphlet to each party, without the danger of its being betrayed to the other. He might then have explained to the Catholics, what this ſecret *opening* is, which "*may admit them to additional privileges*," without alarming the apprehenſions of the zealous Proteſtant; and he might have left the latter ſecure under the conviction, "*that the teſt laws cannot be partially repealed*; and that "*the Catholics could not force their claims with hoſtility againſt the whole power of Great Britain and Ireland.*" As it is, the Catholics can have as little hope from this unexplained *opening*, as I believe they derive conſolation from the Secretary's *arithmetical* comfort. "You are now as three to one, and therefore "you have reaſon to expect equal rights; you will "then be, but as three to fourteen, and it would "be very unfair in you, and againſt every prin- "ciple in Cocker's Arithmetic, to aſk to be on "an equal footing." The Proteſtants indeed have

have ſome ſecurity in Mr. Pitt's immoveable reſolution againſt repealing the teſt laws, which could be attended with *no danger*; while perhaps the interference of the Engliſh Cabinet a few years back on the Catholic ſubject, may raiſe ſome troubleſome ſuſpicions.

The fact is, Mr. Pitt will be governed by what he conceives his intereſt; and according as that great leading object, that "*Ireland may not grow too powerful to govern,*" ſhall be affected, ſo will the claims or the prejudices of Catholics and Proteſtants be yielded to or indulged.

But which ever follows, whether the Catholics are gratified, or not—the effect will be the ſame —bitter and laſting animoſity. Are they refuſed becauſe "*the teſt acts cannot be partially repealed,*" or on the principle of *arithmetical juſtice?* To the intolerance of Iriſh Proteſtants will they attribute it. Are all diſabilities removed? to the policy of the Britiſh miniſter, and the generoſity of a Britiſh Parliament, will they conſider themſelves indebted, while the Iriſh Proteſtants will feel themſelves made the ſport of miniſterial convenience, and will complain of the breach of that *grand condition*, on which they ſurrendered their independence. In either caſe, the Machivaelian policy will be purſued, of preventing Ireland "*becoming too powerful to govern,*

vern,"—but "*religious diſcontents, jealouſies, and diſturbances, conſpiracies, inſurrections, and perhaps* REBELLIONS," will ſtill diſgrace us.

But let our conſtitution remain as it is. Let a Proteſtant Iriſh Parliament make one great effort of patrotiſm—let it bury in oblivion the errors and vices of our poor miſguided countrymen, wiſely and humanely conſidering, that many of thoſe errrors and vices are the weeds that muſt ſpring from an impoveriſhed ſoil—or if this be too great a ſacrifice to expect on the ſudden from human prejudices, let the Catholics patiently await the operations of time, and the workings of generoſity in *Iriſh* boſoms—let them publicly declare, that to an *Iriſh Parliament only* will they be indebted for their full and complete advancement to the privileges and honours of the conſtitution; and then indeed, in either event, whether of peaceable and patient acquieſcence, or of liberal and voluntary conceſſion, we ſhall become "*too powerful*," not "*to be governed*." but to be *ſeduced*, to be *corrupted*, to be *enſlaved*.—Then indeed, will all ranks and all ſects give the ſame hearty and zealous ſupport to the Britiſh Empire, which it has ever received from the Iriſh Parliament; and then will our encreaſed wealth, the ſure conſequence of genuine *unforced* tranquillity, enable *Iriſh generoſity* to contribute largely and freely to the relief of the Empire from its heavy burthens.

The

The wretched politicians, who have inculcated in the miniſter and Parliament of Great Britain, that proſperity may make "*Ireland too powerful to govern*," are totally unſupported in their ſlaviſh and timid doctrine by all experience, and by every principle of common ſenſe. Can a ſingle inſtance be adduced, where in the Parliament of this country, or any great body of men of any *power*, or any ſingle individual of *power*, betrayed the ſlighteſt ſymptom of diſſatisfaction at that imperial connection with England, from whence ſprings the governing power —except the regency, an inſtance, it is hoped, ſufficiently explained, no ſuch thing ever occurred, and it would be moſt eaſy and moſt ſatisfactory to this kingdom, to adopt ſuch regulations, as would ſet at reſt every imperial queſtion, that can ſuggeſt itſelf as likely to occur, to the moſt jealous or the moſt ſpeculative politician. Peace and war, an imperial concern, the choice of which theory gives to the crown, but practice to the Parliament, by their power of granting or withholding the ſupplies; let all *theoretical poſſibility* of Iriſh interference on this important general queſtion, affecting the whole Empire, be for ever removed; let it be enacted, that when the king ſhall have declared war, and the Britiſh Parliament ſhall have given its ſanction, the Iriſh Parliament ſhall be bound to follow. Let *all queſtions of trade* be finally and irrevocably ſettled, upon fair and reciprocal terms,

terms, ſuch indeed as moſt of them already ſtand upon. Let the religion of the ſtate, if that ſhall alſo be deemed expedient, be placed upon a ſure foundation, not to be altered or affected, but by the concurrence of the two Parliaments---and to go a ſtep farther, and to accompliſh what, perhaps, is the miniſter's grand object in the Union, let Ireland, in proportion as her rapidly encreaſing proſperity ſhall afford the means, contribute to the leſſening that enormous load of debt, which England has contracted chiefly in her miraculous ſtruggles for the ſupport of that proud pre-eminence, which ſecures to every part of the Empire its conſtitution, its laws, and liberties. Indeed it has long ſince occurred to the author, that from the moment Ireland experienced fair and liberal treatment from Great Britain, was reſtored to a free conſtitution, and was admitted to a full participation of her commerce, ſhe ſhould contribute her full proportion to the general expences of the Empire; hitherto ſhe has been unable to do more than maintain her own eſtabliſhment, which has alone produced a large debt; nor could an infancy of fifteen or ſixteen years be expected to do more. But Ireland is advancing with rapid ſtrides to a vigorous manhood; a few years of peace would, in all probability, enable her to make great contributions; and it would, in fact, be as ſound policy in her, as fair and generous dealing, to aſſiſt in leſſening the debt of England. Suppoſe that a *moderate*

general land tax, accompanied with a modification of tythes, and of the exciſe and cuſtoms, were eſtabliſhed over the whole Empire, and the ſurplus, after the payment of the preſent charges, were applied to the diſcharge of the public debt of England and Ireland, which might be conſolidated for the purpoſe. Mr. Adam Smith, in recommending this meaſure, including in it the Weſt India iſlands, and alſo including America, which muſt now be omitted, calculates that a revenue of ſix millions two hundred and fifty thouſand pounds might be raiſed, and ſince the date of his book, 1775, a prodigious increaſe of wealth and ability has taken place in the two kingdoms; however, making allowance for the deduction of America, and for the heavy taxes of other kinds, laid on ſince, ſuch a revenue might be raiſed, as would, in a few years greatly diminiſh the public debt, and ſoon admit of a reduction of ſome of the moſt oppreſſive taxes, thoſe that chiefly affect the poor, and the materials of manufactures.

This generous contribution, in the mode propoſed, would have another good conſequence —it would operate as a tax on abſentees, a juſt ſubject of popular complaint, without raiſing any jealouſy in England; and this mode of diminiſhing the ill effects of abſentees, upon the *temper*, if not upon the *intereſts* of Ireland, may, to an ordinary underſtanding appear, as efficacious,

ous, as the miniſterial writers propoſal of *doubling their number*.

The advocates for a Union may cry out, all this will be done by a Union, it will be a neceſſary conſequence of it, and therefore in admitting the expediency of ſuch a meaſure, you in fact argue for a Union, one of whoſe chief objects it is, to make Ireland pay a *full proportion* of our public debts. But the *proportion* (admitting we ſhould pay any thing,) is the great object, and to ſubmit this to a Britiſh Parliament, where Iriſh members would be at moſt but as one to five, would argue great confidence in Britiſh generoſity, but very little of ſound political wiſdom.

Neither, would it be more prudent to entruſt the final ſettlement of ſo important a matter to commiſſioners, in which we might be on an equal footing, as to numbers, with England, for reaſons ſufficiently obvious from the preponderating influence of the Engliſh Miniſter.

The analogies employed to juſtify this meaſure, and the recurrence to the caſes of America, of Scotland, and above all the obſcure and miſty period of the Heptarchy, would ſcarcely deſerve an anſwer, but that the *authority* from which the publication in queſtion proceeds, and the *weight* given to every thing ſtamped with

that authority, requires that no argument, however flimſy in itſelf, ſhould paſs unnoticed. However as to the Heptarchy, it is only neceſſary to ſtate the conſtitution of that Union, to ſhew how totally inapplicable it is to ours. SEVEN *ſeparate and diſtinct kingdoms*, where, "though "one Prince ſeems ſtill to have been allowed, "or to have aſſumed an aſcendant over the "whole, his authority if it ought ever to be "deemed regular or legal, was extremely li-"mitted; and each ſtate *acted as if it had been* "*independent and wholly ſeparate from the reſt.*"* What was the condition of America, before its preſent confederation? *Thirteen independent Provinces*, bound by *no one common tie*, but an alliance or treaty offenſive and defenſive, the regulations of which were ſubmitted to a congreſs, whoſe members, veſted with moſt of the powers poſſeſſed by our ſovereign, and having no controuling or influencing authority over them, might naturally be expected, (as they actually did) frequently to differ on the moſt eſſential points. Can this conſtitution or this connection be compared with ours, wherein our common ſovereign poſſeſſes that ſole undivided power, which was here diſtributed among thirteen independent States? Can the miſchiefs reſulting from that form, not indeed of connection, but of *alliance*, juſtify any apprehenſions of ſimilar

* Hume's Hiſt. of England, Vol. 1. p. 27.

ſimilar miſchiefs from our *cloſe connection*, ſo different in theory, and in practice affording no inſtance (or one not to be argued upon,) of diſagreement, during the lapſe of many centuries.

But Scotland is ſo invariably and ſo confidently reſorted to as a caſe of ſtrong analogy, that it is neceſſary at greater length to ſhew from its ſituation, natural and political, at the time of the Union, and from its hiſtory ſince, that no argument whatſoever ariſes from it, applicable to Ireland, at leaſt none favourable to Union.

Nature had already made England and Scotland one country, and their political circumſtances rendered it neceſſary to the repoſe and ſafety, to the laws and the liberties of England, to accompliſh her fiat. Their *laws* were different—their *religions*, as well of the ſtate, as of the people, were different—their *crowns*, accidentally placed on the head of the ſame monarch, were, upon her demiſe to be again ſeparated. If different views of policy ſhould be entertained by theſe two *independent* nations, in their domeſtic concerns, and in their foreign alliances, future wars muſt again, as they had formerly for ſo many centuries, deluge them both with blood. Now the moſt oppoſite views of policy were in fact entertained by them, not merely by the mob, (as is ſuppoſed to be the caſe) here, but by the gentry, the men of property, the *Parliaments* of the

the two kingdoms. The Houſe of Stewart, ſo odious to Great Britain, had ſtill retained the warmeſt affection of the Scots—and the Parliament of Scotland had lately paſſed the act of ſecurity, by the extraordinary majority of ſeventy, in ſpite of all the influence of the crown: and the royal aſſent was even extorted to a law, which on the death of the Queen, then without hope of iſſue, went to ſeparate the two crowns, and of courſe the two kingdoms for ever.* What muſt have been the temper of the Scots, when a Britiſh miniſtry were compelled to aſſent to an act of ſeparation! Nor were they mere motives of natural diſlike to England which affected the Scots—they had always been attached to the French, with whom their monarchs had been allied, and who gave them ready aſſiſtance upon every breach with England—and perſonal motives of ambition likewiſe operated upon individuals, particularly the Duke of Hamilton, nearly allied to the Houſe of Stewart, and having himſelf, as is juſtly ſuſpected, deſigns upon the throne.†

To the ſafety of England then it became indiſpenſably neceſſary, to put an end to the Scottiſh Parliament, as the only poſſible means of averting

* Such were not indeed the expreſs limitations, but the conſequences were ſo conſidered. Macpherſon's Hiſt. of Great Britain, 2 vol. 306.

† Macpherſon's Hiſt.

averting the evil of ſeparation. Now will any experience, will any ſuſpicions, will any theory however wild juſtify us in ſaying there is a danger of our ſeparation from England?—at leaſt from any circumſtances which an Union would remove—it is not at leaſt from any diſpoſitions manifeſted by the gentry, by the property, by the Parliament of Ireland—if any ſuch tendency prevail, it is among the lower claſſes of the people, corrupted by the empirics of the French School, whoſe poiſon can be beſt and perhaps only counteracted by a reſident gentry and *a reſident Parliament*, who are unalterably, and without an exception, from the moſt unequivocal motives of ſelf intereſt, if there were nothing elſe to operate, bound to maintain the connecton to the laſt extremity.

Nor was the Union leſs advantageous to Scotland, than neceſſary to England, if their paſſions had permitted the Scotch to advert to the moſt obvious principles. Their country was in that wretched ſtate as to agriculture, manufactures and commerce, to which the harſh decrees of nature ſeem to have doomed it. The ſevere, but perhaps neceſſary policy of England had juſt cloſed the barriers againſt the only article of export afforded by her cold ungrateful ſoil,* and had

* Live cattle! no other proof of her poverty, than the nature of her only commodity capable of excluſion from England, would perhaps be neceſſary.

had even gone ſo far as to deny to the Scots the privileges of Engliſh ſubjects.

The work of a very intelligent Scotch writer affords us a curious and accurate view of the relative wealth of England and Scotland at the period of the Union, from whence we may judge of the poverty of the latter, and of the analogy between it at that period, and Ireland now.*

Engliſh Cuſtoms -	£1,341,559
Scotch do. - -	34,000
Engliſh Poſt-office -	101,000
Scotch do. - - -	1,194
Coinage - -	8,400,000
Scotch do. - -	411,118
Exciſe - - -	947,602
Scotch do. - -	33,500

So that conſidering, with Mr. Chalmers—cuſtoms to be the criterion of trade—exciſe of conſumption—and according to general opinion—the Poſt-office to be the ſtandard of internal communication, the reſult of peace and civilization, and coin of internal trade. Their relative

* Chalmers's Comparative Eſtimate. Lond. Ed. 1794, page 225.

lative ſituations in theſe four particulars will be nearly thus:

Engliſh Trade	to Scotch Trade, nearly as	36 to 1
Conſumption	- -	28 to 1
Communication	-	100 to 1
Internal trade	- -	20 to 1

The laſt item ſeems to be the leaſt unfavourable to Scotland, but coin was then a fallacious ſtandard. Bank paper diminiſhed the quantity of coin circulated in England—but Scotland had no bank—however, let a balance be ſtruck upon three of thoſe items, as they ſtand, in order to form an eſtimate of the general ability of Scotland at the time of the Union; namely upon external, and internal trade, and conſumption—and it will be England to Scotland as, *twenty-eight* to *one*. Mr. Pitt, in his ſpeech on finance this ſeſſion, calculates the preſent ratio of ability to be as eight to one. Moſt convincing and unanſwerable proof of the then deplorable poverty of Scotland.

Now ſhe could not hope in centuries to riſe to any degree of opulence, or even of comfort, unaſſiſted and alone—her climate harſh and nipping—her ſoil ſtubborn and ungrateful—the face of the country chiefly mountain or moraſs;

no foreign treaties which could enable her to ſupply her deficiencies; excluded from the Engliſh colonies; her ſhips captured by the Engliſh;* even the Engliſh market denied to her only ſuperfluity, her lean half ſtarved cattle;—what poſſible reſource had ſhe but in Engliſh Union? for having no other equivalent to offer, on no other terms would ſhe be admitted to a participation of Engliſh trade.

To enter into a minute detail of the condition of Ireland, in order to ſhew how totally different it is from that of Scotland at the time of the Union, would be a vain parade of information or induſtry; but it may not be wholly unintereſting to detail a few particulars.

Not having leiſure to reſort to official authority, the author cannot give the preſent condition of our trade, and is obliged to reſort to a period very unfavourable to him—the period of 1783, the cloſe of the American war, and before the commencement of our proſperity, conſequent upon the opening our trade. The facts are taken from Lord Sheffield's "Obſervations on the Trade and preſent State of Ireland." Our exports to *England alone*, upon a five years average, ending with 1783, amounted in value to £2,301,444. † Our imports from England on the

* Macpherſon's Hiſtory. † Lord Sheffield's Obſervations, &c. Lond. Ed. 785, p. 284.

the ſame average were £.2,050,445. leaving a balance of £.250,999 in favour of Ireland.

The whole exports of Scotland, to *all the world*, were at the ſame period, upon a four years average, but £.802,345 * So that the *exports of Ireland to Great Britain alone, were nearly* THREE TIMES AS GREAT *as thoſe of Scotland to all the world,* " at a period when the cultivation, the improvement of Scotland had been particularly attended to for eighty years," while Ireland, on the contrary, had laboured during all that time, under the moſt harſh and injurious reſtrictions. The progreſs of Ireland ſince would clearly appear from tables of our exports and imports for the laſt years, which, it is hoped, ſome perſon with more leiſure and better means of information will give to the public. But the oſtenſible improvements of the country are ſo immenſe, as to leave no doubt of the prodigious increaſe of public wealth. Within that period the *Bank of Ireland* has been eſtabliſhed, while private banking houſes, ſo far from being injured, have increaſed in number; the internal trade of the country (the moſt important to every nation) has been wonderfully facilitated by the extenſion of canals, and the improvement of the roads, while the accommodation of ſhipping has

 been

* Chalmers's Comparative Eſtimate, 229, a four years average is taken inſtead of five years, as in the caſe of Ireland, becauſe Mr. Chalmer's does not give the exports of 177[illegible].

been advanced by thoſe moſt ſtupendous works, the Docks, and the great ſouth pier. The linen manufacture has been nearly doubled. The corn laws have been further improved, and agriculture greatly extended. Breweries have been erected all over the kingdom, and the importation of Engliſh porter and ale almoſt ſuperſeded by the excellence of the home manufacture; while new manufactures have ſprung up, particularly cotton, paper, and glaſs—of the laſt of which great quantities are exported. In ſhort, Ireland is not merely now in that ſtate of advanced proſperity, to which the Union has been ſuppoſed to raiſe Scotland, but ſhe has already that advantage over her, to which her ſuperior extent, her ſoil and climate entitle her.

As little argument then can be drawn from the Scotch Union, in a commercial point of view, as in a political one: and it will ſurely require ſomething more than bare aſſertion—ſomething beſides *hypothetical* advantage, before we ſhall relinquiſh that *domeſtic government*, under whoſe foſtering care, in the courſe of fifteen years, our agriculture, our commerce, and our manufactures have ſwelled to an amount, that the moſt ſanguine friends of Ireland would not have dared to prognoſticate.

But ſee what were the effects of this incorporating Union upon Scotland, for nearly half a century

century. So incenſed and inflamed were the Scots at the ſurrender of their independence, that, although they were immediately admitted to a full participation of Britiſh trade, their animoſities continued too violent, for upwards of forty years, to allow them to avail themſelves of its advantages. In 1715, and 1745, they were rouſed to open rebellion, not more by their attachment to the family of Stewart, than by their deteſtation of the Union: and all the writers agree, that it was not till after the year 1746, Scotland began to feel its beneficial effects.

If ſuch a country then, ſo little favoured by nature, ſo little cultivated and improved, in a ſtate of almoſt hopeleſs poverty, felt ſo keen a ſenſe of degradation, though immenſe advantages were opened to her; if the lapſe of forty years was ſcarcely ſufficient to reſtore her to temper: what would be the effect upon this iſland, rich in the choiceſt gifts of nature, highly improved and rapidly improving, poſſeſſing all that was to Scotland the price of her independence, and to whom no compenſation *can be made*, if indeed any thing can compenſate an independent conſtitution?

We are already in poſſeſſion of every thing that England could grant—our trade to the whole world is as open as that of England, excepting

cepting to the Eaſt Indies, which no Union could give us.† The navigation act has been explained, ſo that colonial produce may be exported from Ireland as freely as from England; in ſhort in no ſingle inſtance is there the ſlighteſt reſtriction upon our manufactures or our commerce, to which England herſelf is not ſubject—unleſs it be in the Eaſt Indian monopoly, which affects every port in England except London, as much as it affects Ireland; or in the caſe of our woollen manufacture. As to this latter, the only manufacture which is under any reſtriction greater than the Engliſh one—we may export our woollens to all the world, except to England, whoſe market is cloſed againſt us by high duties. The Secretary does not hint at, much leſs promiſe, the removal of this reſtriction, but if he did, the boon would be ſcarcely worth the acceptance—So great and unconquerable are the advantages of *old eſtabliſhment*, and the ſuperior ſkill ariſing therefrom, aided by enormous capital, that England is able to beat us, not only abroad, but in *our own market*. What hope then that we ſhould meet her in her market, when ſhe underſells us in our own?—The woollen is the great ſtaple of England; eſtabliſhed, protected, and ſucceſſively improved, by the moſt anxious care of the legiſlature for many centuries. Of its prodigious importance to England ſome eſtimate may be formed from two circumſtances—that it is ſuppoſed to

† At leaſt during the monopoly of the Eaſt India Company.——As to this, ſee Page 42. Note.

to employ *a million and a half of people*—and that its exports, from Yorkſhire alone, amounted in one year to £2,371,942,* an enormous ſum—greater it appears than *all* the exports of *all* Ireland to Great Britain. Is it poſſible then to imagine, even if the Britiſh ports were opened to us, and even if we could rival them in their own markets, that ſome means would not be deviſed by a Britiſh Parliament, to ſecure the excluſive poſſeſſion of a manufacture upon which depend in ſo eminent a degree—the wealth, the grandeur, and the ſtrength of England? One important fact is notorious, and in ſuch matters, one fact will outweigh a thouſand ſpeculations—that, although Scotland has had the Engliſh market open to her for near a century—and although ſhe had none of the diſadvantages to encounter, that Ireland would have, of freight, inſurance, &c. and although ſhe has made great advances in the linen, cambrick, cotton and various other manufactures—*in woollen alone ſhe has never made any progreſs* †—at leaſt none that enables her to ſend woollens into England.

Not a ſingle advantage then is held out to us in commerce or manufactures, nor perhaps would it be eaſy to deviſe any that could be given. But this great and awful evil to our commerce and our manufactures is the certain and inevitable conſequence of an Union. That both will be

* Chalmer's Comp. eſt. 203.

† The author is not poſitive of this, but he believes it to be true, with the qualification, which is all that is neceſſary for him.

be at the mercy *for ever*, of a foreign Parliament, where our relative ſtrength will be not more than one to five. Let it not be admitted as an anſwer, that *equal laws*, affecting all parts of the Empire, will be the conſequence—this itſelf may be an evil of the greateſt magnitude;—aſk the cotton manufacturer, who is now protected by a ſmall duty on imported cottons—aſk the paper maker, who has a ſimilar protection—what would be the effect of throwing open the ports? and they will ſay, and truly, *the ruin of their manufactures —this would be the inevitable effect of* EQUAL LAW.

I am no advocate for protecting duties—they are, in general, founded on the moſt erroneous principles—but in our particular ſituation, contending with a ſmall capital and an infant eſtabliſhment—againſt an old eſtabliſhment and enormous capital, it is by protecting duty only, that is, by *unequal* laws only, that we can ever hope to gain that ſtrength, which may at length enable us to place our manufactures on equal terms.—How far we could expect ſuch *partiality* from a Britiſh Parliament, let us judge from experience.—A few years after the Union, a duty was impoſed on malt, equally affecting the Scotch and Engliſh: the Scotch members—lords and commoners—convinced that it would be ruinous to their country, deprecated the law, and voted *unanimouſly* againſt it—but the Britiſh Parliament were inexorable, and paſſed the law.

Let

Let us advert to another inſtance nearer home. When the colonial trade was opened to us, England propoſed to grant a bounty on all Iriſh linens, to be exported from England; nothing could, at firſt view, appear more generous. She would not only pay the bounty on ſuch linens, as in the natural courſe of trade would go to England, and be exported from thence; but ſhe propoſed, that we ſhould pay *no* bounty, but that ſhe ſhould charge herſelf with the burthen of the *whole* bounty on Iriſh linens, merely on condition that they ſhould paſs through an Engliſh port; and ſhe ſaid that her only motive was a regard to our poverty, which could not afford ſo heavy a charge. But our ſagacious and patriotic Chancellor of the Exchequer, the preſent Speaker of the Houſe of Commons, was neither to be entrapped nor ſeduced; he ſaw that under the pretence of generous aſſiſtance, we were to be cheated out of the carrying trade of our own linens, which would thus inevitably be transferred to England; he reſolutely inſiſted againſt the meaſure, and he preſerved to us our direct trade. Now when the Britiſh Cabinet at ſuch a moment as that, when it was making conceſſion from motives of policy, and when any ſuſpicion of treachery might be ſo dangerous, ventured to paſs upon the *Iriſh Parliament*, ſo groſs an impoſition; what could we expect in a Britiſh Parliament? Could we hope that *equal* laws, which might have *unequal* effects, ſhould be modelled,

ſo as to give our manufactures a chance of ſurviving—much leſs could we hope, that a *protection* ſhould be given to them, which for, a time at leaſt, *is neceſſary to their exiſtence.*†

Throughout the whole of this miniſterial production arguments are addreſſed to different claſſes of the people, and to different bodies of the community, as if their intereſts were diſtinct, and ſometimes as if they were oppoſite. We have already adverted to this mode of ſpeaking to the Catholic and the Proteſtant, and we truſt ſufficiently expoſed the flimſy, though inſidious policy.

† Previous to the 33d. Geo. 3. the trade of China was open to us. Let America ſpeak its importance, who, beginning with a ſmall ſloop, has now 130 ſhips in the trade. By the 33d. Geo. 3. c. 31. we ſurrendered this trade to the Eaſt India Company, for the wretched equivalent of ſending out annually, 800 tons of goods from Cork.

Aſk the merchants do they avail themſelves of this pittance of export?—no—previous notice on the 1ſt of Auguſt to the Commiſſioners of Revenue; on the 1ſt of September to the Company in London; then to the Secretary in India; muſt be given, of the nature, amount, &c. of the goods;—*the market is foreſtalled*—the goods muſt go in a Company's ſhip,—*the carrying trade is taken away*,—they muſt go to the Company's Agent,—*he will prefer the Company's goods.*

Sir John Hippeſley was candid in admitting this manœuvre to be one ſtrong ground for Lord Hobart's penſion. But I am not uncandid in doubting of fair play hereafter.

policy. In the ſame manner, Dublin, Cork, and Limerick,—the South, the North, and the Weſt, are treated as if they were inſulated bodies, whereas it is impoſſible to propoſe any ſcheme of policy, affecting the welfare of one, which would not affect them all, though perhaps in an unequal degree.

It is, no doubt, the deſign of the author to caſt the odium of ſelfiſh intereſt on thoſe great bodies, who, it is dreaded, will condemn the Union. Dublin, in particular, will be libelled and, becauſe moſt obvious and glaring injury would be done to it, the citizens and merchants of Dublin will be ſaid, to advert only to partial evils, and to overlook the general effects on the kingdom. But the Secretary is ignorant indeed of the character and the intereſts of Dublin merchants, if he ſo repreſent them. They are not, thoſe petty ſhop-keepers, dependant ſolely on the cuſtom of a large city. They tranſact the chief buſineſs of the linen trade, the great ſtaple manufacture of the kingdom; they direct and govern all the great operations of banking, of inſurance, and of ſtock. Dublin is the key to the greater part of Ireland, and from the extenſion of the canals, muſt ever continue ſo. Are great advantages derived from foreign commerce? Dublin muſt reap them chiefly, becauſe through Dublin muſt the principal part of the kingdom be ſupplied with foreign produce;

are our manufactures, our agriculture, our inland trade extended? Dublin will moſt feel it, becauſe Dublin is beſt ſituated for the reception of the overplus, which will be poured from her into foreign kingdoms. Let not then the Limerick, the Cork, the Waterford, or the Belfaſt merchant be told, that the Dublin merchant is actuated by ſelfiſh jealouſy of their reaping ſuperior commercial benefits. Such will not be the fact. Let Weſt India trade encreaſe as it may, Dublin muſt have her due proportion, becauſe through Dublin muſt the chief part of the kingdom receive the produce of that trade.

Neither is it poſſible that Dublin ſhonld ſuffer an injury, which muſt not be ſenſibly felt in every corner of the kingdom.

The increaſe of abſentees is lightly paſſed over by this author, and it is mentioned as only affecting the Capital; no doubt, it will affect the Capital moſt grievouſly, but it will alſo affect the country, as a very brief conſideration muſt convince every man. It is not in the Capital only that our nobility and men of fortune ſpend their incomes, it is in the country, on their eſtates, that they make the principal and the moſt uſeful expenditures—now, that they will viſit thoſe eſtates ſeldom, and in a ſhort time perhaps not at all, muſt be very obvious to any one, that conſiders the various temptations and inducements, that

will

will operate to a perpetual reſidence in England. To be near the court and the miniſter, at all times, to watch all opportunities—the allurements of pleaſure—the inconveniencies and expence of long journies twice a year, and of ſeparate eſtabliſhments in different kingdoms,—on all theſe accounts they muſt become perpetual abſentees. Experience, that never-failing guide, ſhews us how few of thoſe, once ſettled in England, ever viſit Ireland. The loſs to Dublin indeed muſt be immenſe, and perhaps the following ſtatement may appear not an exaggerated one.

It muſt be allowed, that all the peers returned into Parliament, as well as all the commoners would reſide in London during the winter, and of courſe forſake Dublin—the number of peers, it is ſuppoſed, would be about 25, and as they will probably be men of the firſt fortune, they may fairly be averaged at 5000l. per annum: that the reſt of the nobility will follow their example, there is not a doubt. It is ſo in Edinburgh, ſcarcely a ſingle lord has a houſe there. The reſident peers of Ireland are about ninety, leaving twenty at home, (perhaps too large an allowance,) and deducting 25, there would be 45 more abſentees, who cannot be calculated at leſs than an average of 3000l. per annum. Eighty members of the Houſe of Commons may ſurely be averaged at 2,500l. per annum, and to theſe may be fairly added 100 gentlemen of faſhion or fortune

tune, who would deſert Dublin, when it no longer attracted by intereſt or pleaſure; and they may be averaged at 1,500l. per annum.

25	Repreſentative Peers at	5000l.	125,000l.
45	Other Peers, - - -	3000l.	135,000l.
80	Members of the Houſe of Commons, - -	2,500l.	200,000l.
100	Other Gentlemen,	1,500l.	150,000l.
			610,000.l.

Should this calculation be eſteemed too high, the overplus may be ſet againſt the large ſums to be expended in appeals, ſoliciting acts of Parliament, and various other matters of buſineſs, which muſt then be tranſacted in London. See the effect of this on Dublin alone: *two hundred and fifty* at leaſt, of the beſt houſes thrown on hands would alone ſo overſtock the market, as to annihilate the *building-trade*. But not theſe houſes alone would be on hands, but the great majority too of thoſe of the working claſſes—coach-makers, cabinet-makers, woollen-drapers, haberdaſhers, in ſhort, all mechanics and ſhop-keepers who live by the conſumption of people of fortune, muſt be ruined, and Dublin muſt be a deſert.

This 600,000l. is an annual Capital, which conſtantly puts in motion innumerable other Capitals,

Capitals, the ſum total of which it is impoſſible to calculate: the coach-maker, for inſtance, employed by the nobleman, himſelf employs the baker, the brewer, the grocer, the taylor, and they in return employ each other and thouſands of others, ſo that the expenditure of a ſingle income conſtitutes a part of the capital of thouſands of individuals.

Here then, merely in this ſingle view of the commercial part of the ſubject, ſhall we ſurrender an *annual* productive capital of 600,000l. equal to *twelve millions* ſterling,† which ſets in motion other capitals without end, for diſtant obſcure, theoretical, and probably illuſive gain?

But we are to exchange our idle gentry, for induſtrious manufacturers and merchants! It is a moſt curious ground indeed, upon which we are taught to expect this—hear the gentlemans' own words, "from the circumſtance of the canals, which are making in every part of England, and communicating with London, its i e. Dublin's, demand for all *Engliſh goods*, with Liverpool will greatly increaſe; and in proportion, as canals from Dublin are carried to different parts of the kingdom, it will be the depôt for their conſumption in all articles of *Britiſh* manufacture and import."

Surely

† 600,000l. annual income—equal to twelve millions permamet capital.

Surely it argues a moſt contemptuous opinion of our underſtandings, to put this forward as a ſerious argument. The manufacturers reimburſed for their loſſes by abſentees, by the commerce for *Engliſh goods encreaſing!* But ſuppoſing it to be an advantage, which I own I am not quick ſighted enough to diſcover, is it the *Union* which is to complete thoſe canals in England, or to extend our canals in Ireland? this promiſed benefit (be it one or not) appears to me the reſult of circumſtances totally independant of the Union.

Dublin however is not to be injured, becauſe Edinburgh is now a much greater town, than at the time of the Scottiſh Union. What Scotland was, and how ſhe has encreaſed ſince, have already ſufficiently appeared, and no doubt the capital of a flouriſhing country muſt be ſuperior to that of a country in a ſtate of the moſt abject miſery.—What Edinburgh was then, we are not told, but it muſt have been a poor and wretched town. The old town is of but ſmall dimenſions, little more than a ſingle ſtreet with blind alleys iſſuing from it—and I myſelf have ſeen the houſe which thirty or forty years ago, when the Union *was half a century old*, was the beſt inn in Scotland—a mean and wretched hovel, that would diſgrace the remoteſt corner of Ireland. To compare Edinburgh then at the time of the Union with

Dublin

Dublin, now is monſtrous and abſurd—at this moment, with all the boaſted effects of the Union, it is not comparable to Dublin, in extent, population, public buildings, trade, or wealth—indeed in every thing but architecture it is inferior to Cork our ſecond city.—Beſides, experience ſhews us a remarkable difference in national character, operating much againſt Ireland in calculations upon the Union—ſcarely an inſtance occurs, of the wealth or influence, obtained by Iriſhmen in England, producing advantage to Ireland; they ſeem aſhamed of the name, and eager to diveſt themſelves of all pretenſions to it—The Scotch nationality is notorious—a Scotchman will promote none, will employ none, will buy from none but a Scotchman—his influence promotes his countrymen, and his money, acquired where it may be, and after abſence ever ſo long, finally centers in his own country—ſo that, a Scotch abſentee is only a political or commercial ſpeculator, who will in the end enrich and adorn his native country.—Can there be adduced five inſtances of men of rank in Scotland, however powerful and extended their Engliſh connexions, whoſe chief reſidence, or leaſt temporary reſidence and moſt uſeful expenditure is not in Scotland? Even Mr. Dundas himſelf, a great Engliſh miniſter, who can never expect to reſide out of England, has expended immenſe ſums on a houſe

in Scotland, without hopes of inhabiting it. This is no reflection on the Scotch, it is highly honourable to them—Is it the caſe in Ireland? let the eſtates of the abſentees give an anſwer.

To the ſouthern cities the author promiſes great advantages. What they are no man can conjecture—their admirable ſituation for commerce is the gift of providence, not of an Union—and all opportunities of availing them of it they have already in as ample a degree as England—*no reſtriction whatever exiſts with regard to them, ſeverer than with reſpect to England.* And ſuperior advantages over England they cannot expect—if England or the Empire *want* an additional Dock Yard, and if Cork be the fitteſt place, general policy ſhould adopt it, if it be not wanting, policy ſhould refuſe it—it is to be hoped the carrying, or the failing in, the meaſure of a Union, will not affect the principles of general and imperial policy.

The ſame inſidious artifice, which conſiders as ſeparate, the intereſts of Catholic and Proteſtant, of the capital and of the reſt of the kingdom, affects to repreſent the bar as an intereſted "Phalanx" of political "adventurers," who look to Parliament as the "market for their abilities." The author of theſe pages, himſelf a member of that honourable profeſſion, feels no *individual* reſentment at calumnies which apply not to himſelf.

ſelf. But as a member of the profeſſion, and as an Iriſhman, he ſpurns at the inſinuation, and denies the baſe and ſelfiſh motives. That there are profligate characters at the Iriſh bar, who make Parliament the ladder of their ambition: that there are corrupt men (he will not ſay Secretaries) who encourage, promote, and pandar for the proſtitution, is the ſcandal of the profeſſion. But that the motive of the loſs of *Parliamentary market* actuates the profeſſion, in their oppoſition to the ſurrender of our legiſlature, is a calumny, which the public will not believe, and to which the actions of the bar, *as a body*, and their hiſtory for many years, give the moſt direct contradiction. Are Judges ſelected, not from the rank majority of Parliament, but from the moſt able, the moſt learned, the moſt virtuous lawyers in the hall? Is the office of Solicitor General offered as a tribute to profeſſional merit, and on its refuſal the honourable diſtinction of precedence voluntarily conferred? Are the ſtations of Maſters in Chancery, Chairmen of counties, &c. filled with a total diſregard to Parliamentary intereſt? Who ſo loud, ſo unanimous, and ſo grateful in their praiſe, as this calumniated profeſſion?

The "Parliamentary traffic," the profeſſion deplore as a diſgrace to themſelves and to the par-

liament; but they will not ſacrifice the life of the patient to a partial diſeaſe, nor will they admit the advantage to the community, of excluding all *Iriſh lawyers* from ſeats in the legiſlature. The names and the ſervices of Burgh and of Yelverton are ſtill freſh in the memories of Iriſhmen, and the Parliament ſhall ſtill be kept open for the exerciſe of the moſt diſtinguiſhed talents in that profeſſion, which concentrates the abilities and the knowledge of Ireland.

But who is this perſon that inſinuates, that "the laws are not accurately or deeply ſtudied?" —or who has authoriſed him to ſay, that we require "abler judges?" has he appreciated, or is he capable of appreciating, the profeſſional merit of a Saurin, a Duquery, a Plunket, or a Fox? Or does he know, or has he never heard of, the the manner in which our benches are now filled? He might perhaps have been told of the ſwift diſpatch, the accurate inveſtigation, and the juſt decrees of an Iriſh chancellor, taken from that very Houſe of Commons which he reprobates—and if he enquired, he might find that our beneches, not only in extraordinary talent, and maſculine ſenſe, but in profound knowledge of the law, would challenge a compariſon with England at its proudeſt day.

The miniſterial author, in truth, too well knew the good ſenſe of that learned body, to doubt

doubt the ſentence they would paſs on this revolutionary meaſure—and he dreaded the effect of their authority upon the nation at large; he therefore wiſhed to deſtroy that effect, by vilifying their character, and more than inſinuating the baſeſt motives. But the nation knows too well its obligations to them, on the moſt trying occaſions, to join in the vulgar abuſe of mercenary men. It has not yet been forgotten the ſervices of the Lawyers, in 1782, neither has it forgotten, and it is too ſoon for the CASTLE to forget, the *authors of the Yeomanry Inſtitution.* Lord Camden, and Mr. Pelham, can bear witneſs that it was the *Bar of Ireland*, which ſuggeſted, matured, and by its example confirmed, and ſanctioned to the country the plan of the armed yeomanry—and thoſe diſtinguiſhed men (for the buſineſs was not tranſacted in the office of an under Secretary) will alſo bear witneſs to the genuine patriotiſm, equally untainted by corrupt or factious motives, which governed the conduct of the bar, in that momentous negociation.

But the bar have ſpoken; and the public know the characters of the leaders of the bar on this moſt important ſubject. They know that Mr. Saurin is above all ſuſpicion of mercenary or ambitious views—already at the head of his profeſſion, in emolument, in character and general eſteem—what has he to look for, or what has

has he to fear? Parliament he has repeatedly and unequivocally refuſed to enter—the higheſt offices of the law he has declined, though earneſtly preſſed upon him, by a Lord Lieutenant whom he reſpected, and though called to them by the unanimous ſuffrages of his brethren. Nor is this conduct dictated by any faſtidious humility, but by the juſteſt eſtimate of human life, by a due appreciation of the bleſſings of ſocial and domeſtic comfort, and an abhorrence of the turbulence, the factions, and the corruptions of politics. The accompliſhed, virtuous, and independent ſeconder is equally above ſuſpicion—poſſeſſed of an ample fortune, and without any demands that could render the ſacrifice imprudent, the door of parliament has ſtood open to him; but on grounds equally honourable he has declined to enter. Such were the mover and the ſeconder—and indeed it well became a Saurin and a Spencer, who, in the ſame place, had rouſed the patriotiſm of the bar, to arm in defence of their country—to take the lead on a queſtion, affecting the conſtitution of the kingdom, its peace, and perhaps its connexion with Great Britain. They were followed and ſupported by an immenſe majority,* not merely of numbers, but of the talents, the learning, and the profeſſional eminence of the bar.

In

* 164 to 32.

In truth the bar know very well, that their individual intereſt is as little likely to be injured, as that of any claſs in the community.—The ſame offices which they already fill, as the Secretary obſerves, will ſtill be open to them—and they have little doubt that, in any plan of Union to be propoſed, thoſe offices will be excluſively reſerved to the Iriſh bar, after the manner obſerved on the Scotch Union—and there are even additional places held out to their avarice and ambition.*

But let the conduct of the bar ſpeak for itſelf, and let the meaſure they have adopted ſay, whether it has been dictated by angry diſappointed ambition, or by cool deliberate and patriotic wiſdom. It condemns not the principle of incorporating the Parliaments, it preſumes not, without due diſcuſſion, to ſanction or to condemn the important revolution. It merely affirms it to be, what ſurely no ſophiſtry can deny, an *innovation*, and demands a calm and tranquil moment for its fair and diſpaſſionate diſcuſſion. Is this the conduct of a corrupt faction? or, is it not the advice that would be expected from a grave and ſober profeſſion?

May

* Particularly the place of Maſter of the Rolls, which the Chancellor's attendance on the Britiſh Parliament will render neceſſary.

May their interference ſave their country for the *third time.*† And may poſterity be allowed to ſay of the *bar of Ireland,*

"Cunctando reſtituit rem."

Such are the obſervations that have ſuggeſted themſelves to my mind on a Union, and on its effects upon *Ireland*, ſuppoſing it to be quietly carried. Some moſt reſpectable men think it premature to paſs any opinion on the ſubject, or indeed to diſcuſs it, until its *terms* ſhall be known—while others, equally reſpectable, profeſs their inability to judge of it, *in the abſtract*, ſeparate from its plan, conditions, and limitations. To each claſs of objections it is an anſwer, that theſe obſervations are made upon a plan, not indeed much detailed, but preſenting a ſufficiently diſtinct outline—and that beſides, in the author's humble opinion, *any incorporated* Union with Britain, which muſt ſubſtitute for a domeſtic Parliament, the Parliament of another country, in which Ireland could have but a ſmall proportionate influence, appears to him pregnant with all the difficulties, dangers, and diſadvantages already mentioned.

Differences of opinion alſo exiſt among very learned and able men, whether an incorporated Union ſhould be termed a *revolution*, a change of

† Is it neceſſary to refer to the time of the Volunteers, to make the author's meaning explicit?

of conſtitution or according to a new coined phraſe, a "*new mode of adminiſtering the conſtitution*"—to the plain underſtanding of the author, theſe nice diſtinctions appear to partake more of metaphyſical ſubtlety than of good ſenſe; and, in his humble judgment it can have little effect upon the merits of the propoſed innovation, by what name it is termed—but under the ſanction of the great men who placed King William on the throne, and who found themſelves under no neceſſity of recurring to ſcholaſtic refinement, but plainly and honeſtly called the ſubſtitution of a new family in the room of the reigning one, *a revolution*, I have called and ſhall ſtill take the liberty of calling the ſubſtitution of another Parliament in the room of the exiſting one, a *revolution*.

This word indeed may not be without its uſe; it may ſuggeſt to us, the expediency of imitating the cautious prudence of our anceſtors, who did not in a hurry, and before they had duly weighed their condition, and fully aſcertained the *ſources of their* grievances, and received the unequivocal, and nearly unanimous, ſanction of the people, venture to apply a remedy. For many years had the people ſubmitted to the ſevereſt tyranny, and the fact was ſettled beyond diſpute, that it was from the principles of the reigning monarch, principles *inveterate* and *unchangeable*, that all their grievances aroſe.

In this opinion the people concurred with the Parliament, or rather the convention, who depoſed King James, and ſubſtituted our great deliverer in his ſtead.

Now is the Parliament of Ireland prepared to ſeal its own condemnation? is it ready to ſay, that the grievances of the nation are ſo heavy, as to be irremediable but by *revolution?* above all, is it willing to admit that from the *Parliament itſelf* are all the misfortunes of the country to be deduced? and will it venture to ſign its own death warrant, without ſuch a reſpite, as may enable the people to appreciate its crimes and its virtues?

But the Parliament itſelf, (and its opinion is ſanctioned by the King) has declared what is the cauſe of our dangers and our troubles. A conſpiracy of republicans, working upon the errors, the vices, and the prejudices of a poor and uninſtructed people. They have not ſaid, as ſome miſtaken men do, that it is the animoſity between Catholic and Proteſtant, which produced that curſed conſpiracy and rebellion. Their volume is before the public—the evidence of the conſpirators themſelves is detailed at length —and the concluſion of the Parliament is logical and juſt—it was a conſpiracy, formed by men "who would as ſoon have ſeen Mahometaniſm

eſtabliſhed

eſtabliſhed in Ireland, as the Catholic religion,"* and who knew, that the bulk of "the Catholics were totally indifferent about Reform and Catholic Emancipation."†

No doubt the religious prejudices of the People, chiefly Catholic, were operated upon—but had they been Proteſtant or Preſbyterian, they would have been equally an object with the conſpirators, and an equal though a different inſtrument in their hands.

However, be the rebellion what it might, or let it have ſprung from whatever cauſes—the Parliament of Ireland have ſhewn themſelves fully adequate to its ſuppreſſion; and ſurely if the inveſtigation of its latent cauſes, and of the public diſſenſions, in which they have uſed ſuch laudable diligence, ſhall have ſatisfied them of the real nature of the diſeaſe, they will not want the reſolution and virtue neceſſary to apply a remedy—if it be indeed the withholding from, or the granting to, the Catholic full or further privileges—they will have *power* enough to reſiſt, or *patriotiſm* enough to *concede*, and they will not, by referring the option to another legiſlature, condemn themſelves of weakneſs or of vice.

* Report of the Secret Committee. † Ibid.

But ſhould they be thus regardleſs of their own character, let them pauſe a moment, and conſider the ſacred truſt with which they are inveſted; that they are going to transfer, not their own inheritance only, but that of their children and of their poſterity *for ever*; and let them aſk themſelves, whether when they were appointed *legiſlators* by the people or by the king, they were indowed with a power of creating *other legiſlators* in ſubſtitution of themſelves. Good and learned men may well be juſtified in affirming, that they have no ſuch right, without the previous aſſent of the people, and it will be prudent indeed, if not neceſſary, to aſcertain that aſſent by the moſt unequivocal and unſuſpicious criterion.

And at what a moment would the people be called on to appreciate the merit of the revolution? Terrified loyaliſts, rebels, ſome repentant, ſome malignant, ſome aſtounded, reformiſts, conſtitutionaliſts, arguing upon facts, ſo capable of various conſtructions, and perhaps incapable *now*, of being ſoundly underſtood. Many of the moſt valuable members of large diſtricts, * emigrants, and thoſe who remain, too anxious in the preſervation of their ſtill threatened lives, and the remnant of their ſtill precarious property, to liſten to, much leſs to diſcuſs, a queſtion of deep

* Counties of Wexford, Wicklow Carlow, Kildare, &c.

deep ſpeculation. The monſtrous and inhuman doctrine has been broached, that advantage ſhould be taken of the paſſions, that agitate and diſtract the minds of men, that neceſſarily agitate and diſtract them at the cloſe of a widely extended rebellion—that the intolerance of the orange man, the reſentment of the excluded catholic, the humiliation of the rebel ſeduced or repentant, the terror of the loyaliſt, and the deſpairing apathy of the reformiſt, afford an opportunity not to be loſt, of effecting a revolution, whoſe merits they cannot weigh, to whoſe conſequences they are indifferent, or whoſe miſchiefs they may anticipate with malignant triumph.—Nay, the catholic has been libelled, as expreſſing the barbarous ſatisfaction, of reducing the proteſtant to his own ſtate of political nullity.

Let the miniſter, or at leaſt, let the Parliament beware of adopting a policy ſo cruel and ſo unnatural. Should they ſucceed, a few years of reflection muſt awaken all ranks from their dreams of revenge, of terror, or of apathy—and when they ſhall awake, how bitter muſt be the mutual recriminations, and how inſatiable muſt be the thirſt of vengeance!

The paſſions of Hell will tear their boſoms. Or ſhould they turn from each other on their common tempter, the conſequence is too dreadful to be contemplated, without ſhuddering for the

the ſafety of the *connection*, and *the exiſtence of Britain herſelf*.

Before the author takes leave of the public, he thinks it neceſſary to addreſs a word to Great Britain. Let no ſuſpicion light upon the motives of that generous aſſiſtance afforded to us—let not the enemies of the connection avail themſelves of the plauſible argument, that ſomething elſe than protection was intended in filling Ireland with Britiſh troops—let the motives of our Lord Lieutenant, in adopting that line of conduct, which, however it has been applauded by moderate men, and by none more ſincerely than the writer of theſe pages, yet has certainly, and perhaps unavoidably, produced partial diſcontent—let his motives, I ſay, be clear, as his character has ever been, from the taint of artifice. But above all, let Britain be aſſured, that the death of our liberty would but ſhortly precede the extinction of her own.

This is an important conſideration, which muſt arreſt the notice of every Engliſhman.

It muſt appear certain, almoſt as mathematical induction, that the incorporation of the Parliaments, will inevitably add an *enormous weight of Influence* to the crown, ſufficient indeed to OVERTURN the balance of the three Eſtates.

What

What has the Scotch Union done? are not the ſixteen peers generally conſidered to be nominated by the miniſter? and are the forty five commoners ever found in a minority? Nor is it intended to caſt any vulgar abuſe upon them; perhaps they may be actuated by the pureſt patriotiſm, for, conſidering the ſmall proportion they bear to Engliſh members, and of courſe the ſmall relative weight of Scotland, perhaps it is only by ſupporting the miniſter, they could hope to obtain any benefit for their country.

Now the patronage of Ireland has a ſufficient influence over *four hundred men* to procure conſtant and large majorities for the miniſter. The ſame patronage would not only ſtill continue, but perhaps the patronage of England would afford ſome addition to it if neceſſary. The numbers to be operated upon would be reduced from about four hundred to about one hundred, lords and commoners, the ſame motives of patriotiſm would operate as on the Scotch members; and it is fair to infer, this *four-fold influence* would produce UNANIMOUS SUPPORT OF ANY MINISTRY.

Has the Britiſh nation forgotten the India Bill? What a ferment was then raiſed (it is not now to be ſaid, whether well or ill founded,) on the propoſal of a meaſure, whoſe *doubtful* operation was to limit the power of one eſtate? what an outcry againſt the daring innovation, which was

to

to wreſt the ſceptre from the hands of the ſovereign, and to give it to the houſe of commons! But that was an effect *problematical* and *temporary*, this is one little leſs than *certain*,—and *eternal*, if indeed the conſtitution could ſurvive it.

Ingenious men have been deviſing ingenious plans to obviate this tremendous conſequence—among others, a deſtruction of a number of the moſt corrupt boroughs, equivalent to the number of Iriſh members to be ſent to England,—this however is a ſpeculation too viſionary, and a project too daring to be combated, if indeed, after the ſerious propoſal of a Union, any thing can be termed daring or viſionary.

But, two anſwers may be given to this plan—firſt, a ſufficient number of ſuch boroughs could not be found, belonging to the miniſter; for the venal boroughs are chiefly under the influence of individuals, who ſometimes ſupport and ſometimes oppoſe miniſtry. Secondly, the diminiſhing the number of venal men would facilitate the corruption of the remainder.

With perfect juſtice therefore has the author of the "arguments," called in the aid of French principles. The projected Union is indeed indefenſible

defenſible on any other than modern revolutionary ground.

But ſtill it was not without aſtoniſhment, that at a firſt and haſty view of the "arguments," the author perceived the example of France, in "not only uniting to herſelf, and incorporating a great addition of territory, but in rendering *abſolutely dependent on her will, almoſt all the ſmaller ſtates which ſurrounded her,*" employed as an argument by a perſon, acting under the adminiſtration of Mr. Pitt. What! that miniſter, whoſe grand and boaſted object it is, *to reſtore the liberties of Europe, and to wreſt from France the iron ſceptre of univerſal domination!* That miniſter, whoſe exuberant vocabulary is exhauſted of epithets of indignation and horror at her tyrannical conſolidation!—is it by that miniſter that we are called upon to adopt the "*French principles and force of incorporations, and to* RENDER ABSOLUTELY DEPENDANT ON THE WILL," *of Britain,* the inferior weaker kingdom of Ireland.

Surely the underſtanding of this gentleman muſt have been ſtupified by the Bæotian air of Ireland,—or elſe, he muſt have made a ſacrifice of policy to the vain parade of argument and analogy,—if the latter were his intention, he has fully ſucceeded, for failing on every other ground, he certainly triumphs upon this; the

example, the arguments, and the analogy are moſt ſatisfactory, compleat and unanſwerable.

But Engliſhmen will pauſe a while and conſider the nature and effect of this incorporation, and this conſolidation, and moſt aſſuredly they will find it to be a conſolidation of the pre-eminent and controuling authority of all the Commons of Great Britain and Ireland, and of the interpoſing and correcting power of the Lords, in the hands of the King. Whether this will meet their approbation, let themſelves determine; perhaps they may think public affairs may be ſo beſt conducted, and the Crown be enabled to carry us through this arduous conteſt with the greater energy; perhaps they may adopt, and be ſatisfied with the "new mode of adminiſtering the conſtitution," † or perhaps they may think with our Iriſh Secretary—"that "the government would not be the leſs vigi- "lantly adminiſtered, that it would probably be "adminiſtered with more attention, *becauſe it* "*would be leſs diſtracted by the buſineſs of party* "*and of* PARLIAMENT." But the conſequence appears to my mind inevitable—the ſubverſion of the conſtitution of Britain.

Is

† Letter of an Iriſh Barriſter to Joſhua Spencer, Eſq. Here at length we find the meaning and value of the learned gentleman's definition of an Union. It will indeed be a "*a new mode of adminiſtering the conſtitution*," by the Crown alone, free from the controul or interpoſition of the Houſe of Commons or Houſe of Lords.

Is Britain then ſo intoxicated with the glories of triumph, or ſo corrupted by the influx of commercial wealth, as to diſregard the blow aimed at her liberty?—and has ſhe ungratefully forgotten, that it is to that liberty alone, to that conſtitution alone, unrivalled and inimitable, that ſhe owes all her triumphs and all her wealth.

Even here I would call on the generoſity and compaſſion of my countrymen, and if they think their own independence unworthy preſervation—let them at leaſt regard the ancient and venerable fabrick of the Britiſh conſtitution, and let them not with the ſtupid malignity, falſely and wickedly attributed to the catholics, deſtroy the temple becauſe they cannot hope to enter it.

In no reſpect does the bounty of providence to this iſland appear ſo conſpicuous as in this, and it is worthy the ſerious attention of every member of the Empire, that her independence cannot be deſtroyed without the neceſſary deſtruction of Britiſh liberty.

FINIS.

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